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ABSTRACT 
With its public debt amounting to 132.1% of GDP and its negative productivity growth over the last twenty 
years, Italy appears to be the sick man of the European Union. In this Policy brief, we focus on its two main 
plights: high public debt burden on the one hand, sluggish GDP and productivity growth on the other hand. 
Both issues are intimately related: a slow growth limits the budgetary margins and casts doubts on public 
debt sustainability; the reduced fiscal space in turn weighs on growth and public investment. 
The first part is dedicated to describing the history and causes of Italian public debt. A first phase, from the 
1960s to the 1980s, was characterized by a positive but moderate growth of debt. A second phase saw the 
explosion of public debt, from 54% of GDP in 1980 to roughly 117% in 1994. The budget law of the 
Amato's government in 1992 initiated a third phase, marked by a significant fiscal consolidation effort, and 
the decrease of the public debt to GDP ratio. The Great Recession interrupted this consolidation era and a 
last phase began from 2008 on, when the public debt-to-GDP ratio consequently increased. In the second 
part, we review some of the structural weaknesses of the Italian economy. We notably emphasize the 
specialization bias towards low tech sectors, the “nanism” of Italian firms, the misallocation of talents and 
resources, the North-South divide and its related labor market consequences. 
We conclude with four policy recommendations for a revival of growth in Italy. Our first proposal is 
technical and proposes a new European fiscal golden rule which would remove specific public investments 
from the computation of structural primary balance. Our second and third proposals are related to the 
regulation of the labor market, with the introduction of a minimum wage on the one hand, and the 
facilitation of retraining policies on the other hand. Last, we call for a revival of industrial policies in order to 
foster knowledge accumulation and firm learning. Our view is that Italy's fate is inextricably related to 
Europe's and that Italy needs more rather than less Europe. 
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With its public debt amounting to 132.1% of GDP and its negative productivity growth 
over the last twenty years, Italy appears to be the sick man of the European Union. In this 
Policy brief, we focus on its two main plights: high public debt burden on the one hand, 
sluggish GDP and productivity growth on the other hand. Both issues are intimately related: a 
slow growth limits the budgetary margins and casts doubts on public debt sustainability; the 
reduced fiscal space in turn weighs on growth and public investment.
The first part is dedicated to describing the history and causes of Italian public debt. A first 
phase, from the 1960s to the 1980s, was characterized by a positive but moderate growth of 
debt. A second phase saw the explosion of public debt, from 54% of GDP in 1980 to roughly 
117% in 1994. The budget law of the Amato's government in 1992 initiated a third phase, 
marked by a significant fiscal consolidation effort, and the decrease of the public debt to GDP 
ratio. The Great Recession interrupted this consolidation era and a last phase began from 
2008 on, when the public debt-to-GDP ratio consequently increased. In the second part, we 
review some of the structural weaknesses of the Italian economy. We notably emphasize the 
specialization bias towards low tech sectors, the “nanism” of Italian firms, the misallocation 
of talents and resources, the North-South divide and its related labor market consequences.
We conclude with four policy recommendations for a revival of growth in Italy. Our first 
proposal is technical and proposes a new European fiscal golden rule which would remove 
specific public investments from the computation of structural primary balance. Our second 
and third proposals are related to the regulation of the labor market, with the introduction of 
a minimum wage on the one hand, and the facilitation of retraining policies on the other 
hand. Last, we call for a revival of industrial policies in order to foster knowledge accumulation 
and firm learning. Our view is that Italy's fate is inextricably related to Europe's and that Italy 
needs more rather than less Europe. 
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Introduction
Characterized by a negative productivity growth over the last twenty years, Italy brings up the 
rear of growth in the European Union. In addition, Italy's public sector ranks as one of the most 
indebted in the world, with a debt amounting to 132.1% of GDP in 2018. The country which, 
after the second world war, became the symbol of the “economic miracle”—a period of 
unprecedented economic and employment growth, high productivity and real income 
increases—does not seem to find the way out of its doldrums. Today, the world tenth economic 
power conveys the image of a clay-footed colossus, prisoner of a low growth trap, a high debt 
burden and structural weaknesses that the Great Recession of 2008 have exacerbated further. In 
this Policy brief, we focus on the two main plights of Italy: high public debt burden on the one 
hand, sluggish GDP and productivity growth on the other hand. Both issues are intimately 
intertwined: the absence of growth increases the debt burden; the reduced fiscal space in turn 
weights on growth and public investment, depriving the economy of one of its engines.
Our first goal is to retrace the history of the Italian public debt problem. We identify the origins 
of Italy's sizeable government debt, and we shed some light on the drivers affecting its 
evolution. We show that this evolution can be decomposed into four distinct phases. In the last 
phase, we document how a badly-timed fiscal consolidation policies contributed to both 
limiting GDP growth and raising public debt. Yet, the origins of the Italian economic decline are 
much more ancient. In the second part, we review some of the structural weaknesses of the 
Italian economy, notably a specialization bias towards low tech sectors, the “nanism” of Italian 
firms, the misallocation of talents and resources, the North-South divide and its related labor 
market issues.
We conclude the Policy brief with four policy recommendations which could help reigniting 
economic growth in Italy. Our suggestions include a technical proposal—creating a new 
European fiscal golden rule which would remove specific public investments from the 
computation of structural primary balance—as well as proposals to tackle labor market issues, 
with the introduction of a minimum wage and the facilitation of retraining policies. We also 
advocate a revival of industrial policies that should nurture knowledge accumulation and firm 
learning. Last, we consider that Italy's fate is inextricably related to Europe's and that Italy needs 
more rather than less Europe. Therefore, the country must play its part to the full in order to 
help reshaping Europe.
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At the roots of the explosion of public debt in Italy 
Italy’s public sector ranks as one of the most indebted in the world, with a debt amounting to
132.1 % of GDP in 2018. Discussions about Italy’s public debt issue, and its potential disruptive
consequences for the stability of the European Union, have for a long time occupied a central
place in political and economic arenas. This Policy brief provides a short historical description of
the Italian public debt problem. The goal is to identify the origins of Italy’s sizeable government
debt, and to shed some light on the drivers affecting its evolution.  
Figure 1 plots the historical time-series of the government debt-to-GDP ratio in Italy starting in
the 1960s. We clearly identify four distinct phases in the history of Italian public debt. A first
phase, between the early 1960s and 1980, was characterized by a positive but moderate growth
of debt. A second phase, unfolding through the 1980s and until 1992, saw the explosion of
public debt, from 54% of GDP in 1980 to roughly 117 % in 1994. The third phase, which began
with the budget law of the Amato’s government in 1992, coincides with a significant fiscal
consolidation effort, and the public debt to GDP ratio eventually decreasing below 100% in
2007. The stabilization effort was however interrupted by the Great Recession and by its effects
on public finances in the European Union. In the fourth phase, from 2008 on, the public debt-
to-GDP ratio consequently increased, reaching the current level of 132.1% in 2018. 
Figure 2 shows how the different drivers of public debt and GDP (government primary deficit,
interest expenditure as a fraction of nominal GDP, real GDP growth and inflation) contributed to
the growth of the public debt-to-GDP ratio.1 The chart indicates that the seeds of the rapid
growth of the Italian government debt observed during the 1980s must first be found in the
Figure 1. Evolution of the Government Debt to GDP ratio
  In % of GDP
Source: AMECO database.
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high and persistent primary deficits that were accumulated by Italian governments since the 
mid-1970s, and that contributed significantly to debt growth in spite of a high real GDP growth, 
positive inflation and low interest rates favored by the monetary financing of public debt.
As it has been noted elsewhere (see Rossi, 2007 and Spaventa, 2013 among others) this fiscal 
profligacy stemmed from the inability of Italian governments to finance the increase in welfare 
state related government expenditures with a stable increase in tax revenues.2 The fragile fiscal 
stance of the 1970s and 1980s alone would however not solely explain the explosion in public 
debt. A second, and equally important contribution, came from the robust rise in interest 
payments. The latter stemmed from two factors. First, after reaching a peak in 1976, with 
monetization accounting for 55 % of the borrowing requirements, the practice of monetary 
financing of debt began to decrease, following the so-called “divorce” between the Bank of 
Italy and the Ministry of Treasury in 1981. Second, in the framework of the European Monetary 
System (EMS), fixed exchange rates were implemented.3 These policy choices aimed at 
disinflating the Italian economy and at pushing forward the European economic integration 
process. Yet they also resulted in a significant and prolonged increase in the real interest rate on 
public debt in Italy, starting from the 1980s.
1. Appendix A gives more information about the calculation of the different contributions and the time-series used. 
Figure 2. The drivers of Italian public debt growth
Contributions to the growth of the ratio public debt/GDP 
Note: The black line tracks the debt-to-GDP growth. 
Source: AMECO and OECD Economic outlook databases.
2. Italian public spending rose from 30.4% of GDP in 1970 to 42.7 % of GDP in 1990.
3. This imposed a significant external constraint on Bank of Italy’s interest rate policy. In particular, the bank was forced 
to increase interest rates to dampen excessive devaluation pressures on the Italian lira (which were frequent in that 
period, especially at the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s).
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Box 1. Who owns Italian government bonds?
At the end of 2018, most Italian government bonds were held domestically (67%). This is obtained 
by summing up the shares of, respectively, households and non-financial firms (5%), domestic 
banks (20%), other domestic non-bank financial firms (22%) and the Bank of Italy (20%). The latter 
increased its share of public bonds in the framework of the Quantitative Easing (QE) programs of 
the ECB (Figure Box 1). The remaining 33% share is held by non-residents (both financial and non-
financial). The figure also shows how the government bonds holding structure evolved during the 
last 18 years. The share held by domestic households and non-financial firms underwent a slow but 
steady decline from an initial value of 20 % at the beginning of 2001. The bond share of foreigners 
followed a slightly different pattern. It first increased up to reach a peak of 50 % in the first half of 
2010, before more than halving in the following years, as a consequence of the turmoil related to 
the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. It turns out that domestic households and non-financial firms at 
the beginning of 2000s were progressively replaced by domestic financial institutions and—even 
more so—by the Bank of Italy.
 On the one hand, a large domestically-owned share of government bonds represents a source of 
stability. Domestic investors are less likely to divest during an economic downturn. On the other 
hand, a large bond share held by domestic financial institutions, and banks in particular, implies a 
high interdependence between the domestic financial system and public debt, with possible 
negative effects on credit supply and on real economy in case of rising bond yields. Many efforts 
have been made at the European level since the 2008 crisis to curb the link between the banking 
and the government sector, notably by establishing the Banking union. Still, large increases in bond 
yields could trigger a credit crunch and a self-reinforcing vicious spiral if banks are overloaded with 
sovereign debt of their home country. Another problem lays in the sizeable portion of debt (20%) 
now held by the Bank of Italy, which should be redeployed on the market at the end of the QE, with 
uncertain consequences on yields. In light of these issues, policies increasing the share of debt held 
by domestic households (like in Japan) could be helpful in reducing the impact of fluctuations of 
government yields on credit supply.
Figure Box1. Italian outstanding government bond holdings
In % Ownership
Source: Bank of Italy.
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The 1992 budget law by the Amato government marked a turning point in the history of Italian 
fiscal policy, and the beginning of a fiscal consolidation phase that lasted for more than a 
decade. Table 1 compares the structural primary balances of governments in the Euro 12 from 
1995 to 2018; it gives an idea of the consolidation efforts made by the Italian governments 
during the 1990s as well as during the first decades of the 21th century. The structural budget 
balance is indeed the primary balance, corrected for the effect of the business cycle on tax 
revenues and government expenditures. It thus provides a concise measure of fiscal 
consolidation (or its lack thereof). On average, Italian governments persistently scored sizeable 
structural primary surpluses during the entire period considered. In addition, these surpluses 
were always much higher than the average in the Euro 12.
The main result of this fiscal consolidation was the reduction of the public debt-to-GDP ratio 
from a 117% peak (reached in 1997) to a value below 100% in 2007 (cf. Figure 1). 
Nevertheless, given the high level of outstanding debt at the beginning of the 1990s, such a 
reduction would have been impossible without the significant decrease in real interest rates on 
debt, which was observed starting from 1993 (see Figure 2). This steady trend was the outcome 
of the interest rates convergence triggered by the process that ultimately led to the introduction 
of the euro, and it is undoubtedly one of the greatest benefits that Italy has gained from the 
introduction of the common currency.
The fiscal consolidation efforts in the 1990s and the early 2000s were completely wiped out by 
the 2008 Great Recession and the consequent sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The Italian public 
debt-to-GDP ratio rose sharply in few years from roughly 100 % in 2007 to 131 % in 2014, and 
Table 1. Average net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) excluding interests of general 
government adjusted for the cyclical component
In % of GDP
1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015-2018
Austria 0.230 1.147 -0.266 0.306 1.523
Belgium 5.783 5.458 1.663 0.014 1.193
Finland 3.196 5.610 2.500 -0.324 0.633
France 0.694 -0.226 -1.664 -2.150 -0.880
Germany -0.533 0.026 0.984 1.494 2.124
Greece 2.454 -0.898 -7.976 -2.200 4.001
Ireland 4.849 0.936 -3.853 -3.931 -1.498
Italy 5.168 2.006 0.321 2.081 1.987
Luxembourg 4.364 2.375 1.453 1.824 1.618
Netherlands 2.051 0.884 0.145 -1.186 1.648
Portugal 0.242 -2.124 -3.226 -1.955 1.972
Spain 1.245 1.830 -2.489 -4.104 -0.739
Euro 12 2.479 1.419 -1.034 -0.844 1.132
Note: Adjustments based on trend GDP.   
Source  AMECO database. Authors' calculations.
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it has been fluctuating around that value since then. It is worth noticing that: (i) this upsurge of 
31 percentage points in public debt occurred in half of the time that it took to reduce the same 
ratio by 20 percentage points (see supra); (ii) the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio occurred 
despite the significant structural primary fiscal surpluses accumulated by the Italian 
governments (see the last two columns of Table 1). The main causes of this debt resurgence 
were the rise in real interest rate on debt, observed during the 2008-2012 period as a 
consequence of the sovereign debt crisis (see Figure 2), and the low GDP growth rates 
(negative real GDP growth gave a positive contribution to debt growth during that period). The 
formula calculating the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio (see Appendix) helps understanding 
why a small increase in the average real interest rate or a small reduction in nominal GDP 
growth bring about rapid increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio. An increase in primary deficit-to-
GDP (e.g. a 1-point increase) contributes to accelerating the growth of the debt-to-GDP ratio 
by the same order of magnitude as the increase itself (thus 1 point). The contributions of either 
a 1-point increase in the average interest rate or a 1-point reduction in nominal GDP growth are 
instead proportional to the size of the current debt-to-GDP ratio (and thus higher than one if 
the ratio is higher than 100%). Hence, in presence of an already high public debt-to-GDP ratio, 
even small increases in either the average real interest rates on debt or small reductions in the 
real GDP growth are able to water down any austerity efforts made by governments (even 
significant ones). 
In a period of structural primary surpluses, low inflation and with central bank interest rates 
already close to the zero lower bound, the only way to reduce Italian public debt is an increase 
in real GDP growth. Unfortunately, as the black line in Figure 3 shows, the real growth of Italian 
GDP has been weak since the 2000s and even negative in 2008-09 and 2012-13, positively 
contributing to the growth of debt. Figure 4 also sheds light on the sources of growth by 
displaying the contributions of the different aggregate demand components to real GDP 
growth since 1996. One first important feature is that the positive (modest) contributions of 
aggregate demand to Italian growth, both before and after the strains of the Great Recession, 
mainly came from domestic components like private consumption and investment. In contrast, 
the positive contribution of exports was almost always compensated by the negative 
contribution of imports.4
A second feature is that the contributions of domestic demand to GDP growth until 2008 
mainly came from private consumption and only moderately from the positive dynamics of 
investment. Yet these dynamics dramatically reverted in 2008, and the significant negative 
contributions of investment and consumption largely explain the double-dip recession that Italy 
experienced from 2008 to 2014.
A final important fact documented by Figure 4 is the near-zero contribution of government 
consumption to aggregate demand since 2008. Clearly, this is the outcome of a combination 
4. Hence, Italy was unable to grow via external demand in the period considered, despite the market integration
opportunities offered by the introduction of the euro in 2000. This reveals a structural weakness of the Italian produc-
tive system, which has lost international market shares since the Great Recession of 2008 (a theme we discuss in
more detail infra).
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between the already high debt-to-GDP ratio and the austerity efforts imposed by fiscal rules in 
the European Union. However, fiscal austerity did not have an impact solely on government 
consumption. Government investment also plummeted more than GDP since 2009 (Figure 4). 
Interestingly, the figure shows how that reduction was partly justified, in a regime of heavy 
constraints imposed on fiscal policy, in order to have more room to finance the increase in 
social benefits expenditure over GDP—due to the increase in unemployment benefits—from 
2008 on.5 Finally, a further negative stimulus to aggregate demand came from the tax burden, 
that significantly increased over GDP between 2005 and 2013. 
Hence, the fiscal austerity aggravated the fall in aggregate private demand by implying a 
reduction in government consumption and investment and a significant increase in the fiscal 
pressure in the period between 2009 and 2013. Sampognaro (2018) estimates that Italian 
consolidation efforts made from 2008 to 2017 reduced Italian GDP by 4 points, among which 
3.5 points were related to national consolidation and 0.5 point was due to the fiscal 
consolidation of trade partners. In addition, austerity was self-defeating as it produced a rise in 
the ratio of public debt-to-GDP that dismantled the consolidation efforts of the 10 years before. 
One explanation for the EU myopia as regards the adverse impact of fiscal consolidation is the 
systematic undervaluation of fiscal multipliers, i.e. the impact of fiscal policy on GDP growth, in 
crisis times (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013). Most theoretical and empirical arguments bring 
support to the claim that the size of fiscal multipliers depends on several factors: the institutional 
Figure 3. Contributions of aggregate demand components to real GDP growth, 1996-2017
 In %
Source:  FRED database. 
5. Another important item that we do not show here is the compensation of employees, which remained stable in rela-
tionship to GDP on the entire 1995-2017 period.
-0.08
-0.04
0.00
0.04
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Real GDP growth rate
Consumption
Investment
Government spending
Export
Import
Italy: escaping the high-debt and low-growth trap l
S c i e n c e s  P o  O F C E   W o r k i n g  P a p e r
9
context, product market competition, the degree of openness, the degree of financial 
constraints. Yet, fiscal multipliers also depend on the cyclical phase of the economy and they are 
in particular higher during recessions than expansions. (e.g. Creel et al., 2011, Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko, 2012). Italy experienced a considerable recession in 2008; De Nardis and 
Pappalardo (2018) show that the size of multipliers in the crisis period (2008-2014) was larger 
than in the pre-crisis period (1970-2007), both on the expenditure and the revenue sides. 
Several papers (for instance Creel et al., 2011; Coenen et al., 2012; Ferraresi et al., 2015; De 
Nardis and Pappalardo, 2018) also show that expenditure multipliers—related to public 
consumption and investment—are significantly larger than multipliers in downturns;6 and it was 
precisely government expenditure which underwent the biggest adjustment in Italy (Figure 5).
Italy’s chronic low-growth problem and its drivers
It would however be incomplete to attribute low growth in Italy only to a badly-timed austerity, 
one that in particular did not take into account the cyclical situation of the economy. Indeed, 
GDP growth in Italy has been significantly lower than in other countries for many years, notably 
before the Great Recession.
Figure 4. Evolution of government expenditure components and total tax revenues in relation 
to nominal GDP, 1995-2018
 In % of GDP
   Source: Eurostat data.
6. See Heyer (2012).
1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019
1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019
1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019
1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019
2.5
2.0
3.0
43
44
45
46
47
48
18
19
20
16
17
18
19
20
Government Consumption Government Investment
Total RevenuesSocial Benefits
l Céline Antonin, Mattia Guerini, Mauro Napoletano, Francesco Vona
S c i e n c e s  P o  O F C E   W o r k i n g  P a p e r
10
As Table 2 reveals, average real GDP growth rates in Italy began to decelerate already in the 
1980s (i.e. in correspondence with the explosion of the public debt, see supra). Nevertheless, in 
those days, average growth rates were still comparable to Germany’s and France’s. The growth 
trajectories of Italy and its neighbors instead became divergent in the 2000s. Italy’s average real 
growth has indeed been below 1% since 2000 and far below Germany’s and France’s.
Another signal about the Italian growth decline can be grasped by looking at the evolution of 
productivity, which is a simple indicator of a country’s structural performance, one that in 
particular captures the efficiency by which inputs are used to generate output. Figure 5 reveals 
how Italian total factor productivity (TFP) experienced a cumulative decline of 7.9% over the 
last 20 years.7 This contrasts with the efficiency gains experienced by France and Germany, 
where productivity increased by 4.1% and 7.9% respectively. 
Table 1. Average real GDP annual growth rates
In % 
1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2014
Germany 3.692 3.177 1.807 2.894 1.493 2.604
France 4.992 4.000 1.141 2.364 1.461 1.952
Italy 4.814 5.063 1.810 2.496 0.881 0.642
Source: University of Groeningen Penn World Table dataset.
Figure 5. Comparison of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) dynamics
   TFP index 
Source: EU-KLEMS data.
7. A more extensive sectoral comparison between Italy and EU economies is presented in Guerini et al. (2018).
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The above-documented Italian decline is the result of country’s specific structural factors 
hindering its growth potential. Some of them, like the dualism between the North and the 
South, have plagued the country almost since its foundation. Others, like the small size of firms 
and the excessive specialization in low tech sectors play a key role in explaining the weak 
investment and export dynamics that we mentioned above. We discuss each of these factors in 
more detail below.
Specialization bias towards low-tech sectors 
Italian industrial specialization has historically been concentrated in low-tech sectors wherein 
the competition of low-wage countries, such as China, became particularly stronger in the 
2000's. A study by Bugamelli et al. (2012) shows that the Italian industrial structure is indeed 
unbalanced towards traditional and low-value added sectors. These sectors also have little 
technological content as well as a low demand for innovative technologies. This limits the 
extent to which newly created knowledge can be applied, e.g. through downstream and 
upstream linkages, to other high-value added uses (renewable energy machineries, robotics, 
bio- and nano-technologies, …). For instance, the broad textile sector (including clothing, 
leather and shoe sectors) accounts for around 14 % of total manufacturing value added in Italy 
whereas it only accounts for 5% in France and 3% in Germany. On the contrary, the sectors 
more prone to innovate (e.g. ICT, radio-television machineries, chemicals and pharmaceuticals) 
account for around 16% of manufacturing value added in Italy, while they represent 20% and 
21% in France and Germany respectively.
The “nanism” of Italian firms 
Italian firms are too small on average to compete in international markets and to trigger a 
virtuous circle of productivity and employment growth. The small-size bias of Italian 
manufacturing companies compared to EU competitors is well-illustrated by Figure 6, 
reproduced from a recent work by Berlingieri et al. (2018). What clearly emerges is that the 
share of micro-firms (below 9 employees) is much larger in Italy than in other European 
countries (bottom panel). In addition, small and medium Italian firms are much less productive 
than their European counterparts (top panel). The productivity gap disappears only for large 
enterprises. The net effect on aggregate productivity depends therefore upon the relative 
balance between small and large firms. Since the medium and large firms in Italy represent less 
than 3% of all the population and the micro and small firms account for around 90% of the 
whole population, the aggregate effect is a lower productivity with respect to the EU partners. 
Three possible explanations may account for the nanism of Italian firms and their low 
productivity. First, “historical accidents” played a key role. One example is the dismantlement 
of the oligopolistic core in the 1990s, also as a consequence of privatization programs (Dosi and 
Guarascio, 2016). Another one is the historically persistent specialization in small-scale artisanal 
productions (De Cecco, 2008). Second, a recent empirical work by Dosi et al. (2012) suggests 
the co-existence of a group of dynamic firms with a generally bigger ensemble of much less 
technologically advanced and small firms. The latter firms nonetheless survive quite 
comfortably, due to the exploitation of local markets niches. However, the small size of these 
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niches is unlikely to trigger significant firm learning and technological spillovers, thus amplifying 
the technological gap of Italian manufacturing with respect to other European countries. 
Finally, a third important explanation is credit constraints, which are on average stronger for 
small firms (see Bottazzi et al., 2014), therefore limiting their growth possibilities.
Talents’ and resources’ misallocation 
Italy is characterized by a chronic problem of misallocation and underutilization of talents. This 
is evident from several well-known indicators, revealing extremely high levels of corruption 
(Transparency International, 2018), incidence of tax evasion (Buehn and Schneider, 2012) and 
of shadow economy (Medina and Schneider, 2018) compared to similar countries in Europe.8
Figure 6. Per capita value added in the manufacturing sector, per macro-region
 Source: Authors’ elaboration from Berlingeri et al. (2019).
8. https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018.
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Distortions in the allocation of opportunities are exemplified by the high social immobility in 
Italy compared to other EU countries (see Franzini et al. 2014).9 Raitano and Vona (2015) show 
that this high social immobility is mainly explained by non-meritocratic channels such as 
nepotism, political patronage and family labor market networks. The resulting perception of 
injustice has led a large number of Italian graduates to migrate in other countries where non-
meritocratic mechanisms are weaker (Güell et al., 2018). Moreover, the prevalence of these 
channels in the Italian labor market undermines the incentives to invest in human capital, 
therefore creating a persistent under-supply of skills needed to increase specialization in high-
tech sectors (Bartelsman et al., 2015). Another aspect of misallocation is the historical 
propensity of Italian entrepreneurs to privilege financial over real investments. De Cecco (2008) 
argues that the origin of this can be traced back to 17th century, when Tuscany lost its lead as 
the European financial center and thus the financial sector remained oversized compared to the 
real economy. Furthermore, Crainz (2003) documents how, following the nationalization of the 
Italian electricity sector in 1962, the former owners of electricity companies chose to invest their 
receipts abroad or in financial assets rather than in expanding the productive capacity of 
domestic firms.  
The North vs. South divide 
The above-mentioned factors hindering Italy’s growth potential are stronger in Southern 
regions than in Northern ones. In addition, the North vs. South divide, which has characterized 
the country almost since its foundation has become more pronounced in the aftermath of the 
Great Recession. Figure 7 gives an idea of the increased North-South divergence in response to 
the crisis. In the 1995-2016 period, the value added per worker (a proxy for labor productivity) 
in manufacturing fell by more than 20 % in the South, and only by 11 % in the North. This 
result is even more striking if one considers that the initial level of productivity was already 
approximately three times higher in the North (15 802 euros in 1995) than in the South (5 499 
euros in 1995). The investments per worker after 2008 have also collapsed much more in the 
South than in the North. And with respect to the 1995 levels, the overall effect has been a 16 % 
increase in the North and a zero gain in the South.10 Not surprisingly, the differential resilience 
to the crisis of Northern and Southern regions mapped into a wider and persistent gap in 
several labor market outcomes. For instance, the North-South gap in unemployment rates 
increased by 25 % after the Great Recession. Such a gap is even larger among those younger 
than 24 years. Finally, we also observe a substantial worsening of the historical North-South gap 
in the incidence of irregular labor and in labor force participation (see figure A1 in the 
appendix).
9. Italy is also an outlier in the so called “Great Gatsby curve” (see Krueger, 2012) which shows the positive correlation
between the cross-sectional and the intergenerational inequalities.
10. Martucci (2016) shows that also public investments dynamics in infrastructures diverged between North and South
of Italy. Since the 1990s, public investment has been falling in the South and rising in the North, further amplifying
the Italian dualism (see also the SVIMEZ 2014 report at https://www.svimez.info).
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The ISTAT data also documents an increase in the North-South real wage gap (a 30 % increase 
in the North, and a 5 % decline in the South over 1995-2016). However, the comparison of real 
wage levels using a national deflator might be misleading as living costs are significantly 
different across Italian regions. A recent work by Boeri et al. (2019) corrects for this bias and 
shows that real wages are lower in the North than in the South. This would indicate the absence 
of relationship between wages and productivity (high in the North and lower in the South), that 
can be related to the centralized system of collective bargaining and the lack of diffusion of the 
two-tier wage negotiation system, mostly occurring at the local and firm levels. Boeri et al.
(2019) show that a decentralization of the bargaining system similar to the German one would 
instead give a big boost to investment and employment in the South. However, such a result 
rests on the strong assumption that real wages are at the market clearing level in the North. As 
a result, this proposal is tantamount to cutting wages in the South. Such a cut, combined with 
the tight constraints already existing on Italy’s fiscal policy, could exacerbate the effects on 
growth and public debt of adverse macroeconomic shocks (like the one of the Great Recession 
discussed above). More generally, it is difficult to believe that wage cuts would be enough to 
incentivize investment in the South of Italy, whose economy seem to be stuck in a low-
employment, low-productivity trap, mostly due to the strong incidence of factors like the 
talents’ misallocation discussed above and to the complete absence of complementary 
production factors that makes investment worth (e.g. physical and infrastructural capital, 
technical skills and firm capabilities). 
Figure 7. Per capita value added and gross fixed capital formation in the total economy
   Source: ISTAT regional accounts.
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Policy recommendations to reignite economic growth in Italy 
Escaping the high-debt low-growth trap is no easy task. The variety and the persistence of factors 
which are responsible for the Italian decline make it difficult to believe in recipes that address only 
some aspects of the problem. The recent political economy debate in Italy is characterized by a 
sharp division between two factions: those who attribute the causes of Italian economic decline 
to the straitjackets imposed by the European fiscal rules and by the common monetary policy, 
and those instead who stress the positive aspects of fiscal consolidations and point to the 
excessive rigidities of labor and product markets as the main cause of the country’s low growth. 
We think that such a polarized debate is not very fruitful. Indeed, this polarization originates 
from considering demand and structural factors as completely separated, which is, in our view, 
misleading. It is clear that Italy’s low growth problem began much before the introduction of 
the common currency (see also Manasse et al., 2014 and the discussion supra). At the same 
time, it is clear that some of the problems, like the regional dualism, are too profound to be 
solved solely by reforms targeting rigidities, but require instead active industrial policies with 
the essential support of government-sponsored investments (in education, research and 
innovation, infrastructures, etc.). In addition, one should not undermine the role that a badly-
timed and self-defeating austerity played in exacerbating the impact of the Great Recession on 
Italy’s growth, regional disparities, and public debt. 
The chicken-egg problem is that, on the one hand, austerity prevents the use of fiscal levers to 
tackle some structural problems of the country. On the other hand, disregarding the role of 
structural problems may undermine the effectiveness of expansionary fiscal policies and of 
public investments in particular. It follows that an approach considering interactions between 
demand and structural (i.e. supply-driven) factors would be more useful in addressing the 
Italian low growth problem and, relatedly, its high debt one. The policy recommendations that 
follow are inspired by this approach.11
Remove public investments from the computation of the structural primary balance that 
is relevant for the excessive deficit procedure
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) should be modified to exclude some specific forms of 
government investment expenditures from the computation of the excessive deficit procedure, 
while current expenditure should be balanced over the course of the business cycle (see Dervis 
and Saraceno, 2014; Saraceno, 2016; Creel and Saraceno, 2010). This modified Golden Rule, 
which is intertemporally fairer than current fiscal rules in the SGP, would allow a high debt 
country like Italy to use certain types of investments both as a cyclical lever to compensate the 
fall of aggregate demand during a recession, and as a long-term instrument to address the 
country’s structural problems. Fiscal discipline would be enforced as current expenditures 
should remain balanced. 
11. See Amendola and Gaffard (2019) and Dosi et al. (2017) for examples of policy design considering the interactions
between short-run and long-run drivers of growth.
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Besides the above golden rule, additional resources for investments could stem from savings on 
unproductive current expenditures (e.g. Cottarelli’s spending review, see Cottarelli, Sole 24 
Ore, 2015). These savings should amount to 34 billion euros in total, and could already free 
significant resources for investment as they would correspond to 1% of Italy’s nominal GDP and 
to 10% of the country’s current total expenditure for gross fixed capital formation.12
Associate public investments to industrial policy and notably mission-oriented public 
programs.
A standard critique towards additional public expenditure programs, as those that would for 
instance be implied by a modified golden rule is that they will ultimately end up in a waste of 
resources, especially in Italy, characterized by high levels of corruption in some areas. A similar 
critique is that those investment programs, like the generous fiscal expansions of the 1970s, 
would not result in an increase in long-term growth. To address these critiques, public 
investment should be associated to industrial policies targeting the structural problems exposed in 
the previous section. The main goal of these industrial policies should be nurturing knowledge 
accumulation and developing capabilities in certain sectors (see Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 2009). 
They could also be implemented via mission-oriented programs targeting specific objectives 
(Mazzucato, 2018a and 2018b), and should be supported by a long-term financial 
commitment from the public sector (see Amendola and Gaffard, 2018).13 An example is the 
green transition that had large multiplier effects at the local level in the United States (see e.g. 
Vona et al., 2019). 
Clearly, to be effective, the above mentioned industrial policies must also be combined with a 
substantial improvement of the quality of Italian public administration. This is to ensure that the 
funds mobilized by such policies are not captured by rent-seekers, criminal firms and politically-
connected incumbents. This is particularly relevant for industrial policies aimed at tackling the 
Italian dualism, whereby Southern companies are usually infiltrated by criminal organizations 
(the recent scandal of wind farms is an example). The creation of special development zones, 
initially isolated by the influence of local actors and with special fiscal and regulatory status, 
could be a solution to trigger a change in Southern regions and create a critical mass of 
dynamic entrepreneurs and capabilities.   
Introduce minimum wage and reinforce retraining policies
As of 2019, 22 out of the 28 EU countries have an official minimum wage; Italy does not. This 
self-exclusion of Italy from the EU standard practice, is partly justified by the fact that the Italian 
labor market is already characterized by a collective “tripartite” wage bargaining at the industry 
level between workers’ unions and firms’ confederations, with the government playing the 
referee between the two parties. Since the collective agreement is automatically extended to 
12. The comparisons refer to the years of the last available observation for nominal GDP (2018) and Gross Fixed Capital
Formation (2017).
13. In particular, the government shall avoid satisfying the shareholders interested in short-term financial gains and shall
stick to its long-run mission.
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everybody, this should in principle guarantee an outcome close to a minimum wage. However, 
the tripartite bargaining sign has shown some weaknesses over the last years, with a substantial 
increase of non-compliance rates and the emergence of contracts signed by unions with little 
representation in the firms (see e.g. Garnero et al., 2015 as well as Lucifora and Naticchioni, 
2018). The most vulnerable (i.e. unskilled) workers are the most penalized by the proliferation 
of these “atypical” labor market contracts.
Introducing a national, statutory minimum wage, determined by using the same tripartite 
fashion as collective agreements, is a way to solve these problems. Sector- and firm-level 
bargaining should be anchored to the minimum wage, which would then constitute a lower 
bound to all other agreements and all types of contracts. In addition, a minimum wage would 
sustain aggregate demand through higher wages to workers who are likely to be more credit 
constrained and thus with a higher propensity to consume. 
Finally, to be effective, the minimum wage should be combined with a convincing and well-
enforced sanction mechanisms for non-compliance, and by giving an active monitoring role to 
unions. In addition, it should be complemented by effective retraining programs for displaced 
and unemployed workers. The design of training interventions should also be radically 
rethought, by reallocating funds to centers with better capabilities to provide good quality 
training such as technical schools and universities.
Italy needs more Europe not less Europe
To reignite growth and solve its public debt problem Italy needs more Europe not less Europe. 
First, abandoning the euro, with a consequent huge devaluation of the currency, would have 
disastrous consequences on Italy’s interest rates and on the government debt burden, which is 
denominated in euros. Second, and more importantly, most policies reigniting Italy’s growth 
require the active participation and cooperation of the European Union to be effective. For 
instance, the introduction of a golden rule of fiscal policy needs re-discussing the entire 
framework of fiscal rules in the EU. The EU could also be helpful in mobilizing additional funds 
for Italy, via a common investment plan for the area (e.g. a Juncker’s plan substantially 
rethought with stronger participation of public actors). Third, even industrial policies nurturing 
learning and firm capabilities seem infeasible without the explicit cooperation of European 
authorities in light of the existing norms constraining support to national firms. The same 
industrial policies would probably be more effective if they were part of a global industrial policy 
agenda of the entire union, rather than being the exclusive focus of single countries. 
In conclusion, Italy cannot solve its economic problems without the help of Europe, but the 
solution of these problems requires an active role of Italy (which is a founding country of the 
union) to a process of overall reform of European policies. This process should ultimately 
converge towards a fully-fledged federal state in Europe, and in particular one with common 
fiscal policy and redistributive mechanisms across states. Indeed, a good deal of the 
conundrums Europe is experiencing, like those associated with migration, economic slackness 
and populistic pressures for disintegration, originate from the incompleteness of the European 
construction. In this respect, it can be helpful to adapt Dani Rodrik’s famous trilemma to the 
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European Union (see Rodrik, 2000, 2007). The trilemma states the impossibility of having at the 
same time globalization, democracy, and the nation state. In a situation where globalization, 
i.e. international economic integration, seems irreversible, preserving democracy requires 
abandoning sovereignty and moving towards a federal state. Europe’s democracies are instead 
stuck in a limbo between the nation state and federalism, where the solution to single countries’ 
problems (like Italy’s low growth one) now require the active cooperation among states, but 
where such a cooperation is difficult or absent. Yet, for federalism not to be perceived as a mere 
technocratic idea, the European political project must be revived. This in particular requires 
deepening the democratic side of Europe and binding together countries with shared European 
values.
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APPENDIX
Data Sources and Authors’ Calculations
Figure 1
General government consolidated gross debt. Excessive deficit procedure. Based on the 
European System of Accounts ESA 2010.
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/indicators-statistics/economic-databases/
macro-economic-database-ameco_en
Figure 2
The decomposition presented in the figure is based on the following law of motion for 
government debt 
Where Bt is the debt of year t, Bt–1 is the debt of the year before, i is the (average) interest on 
debt and St is primary balance of the government in year t. We can now divide both sides of the 
equation by the nominal GDP, PtYt, to have an expression for the debt-to-GDP ratio 
We can now express nominal GDP as follows:
Where π is the inflation rate and g is the growth rate of real GDP. By using the last expression 
one can write the equation of the debt-to-GDP ratio as follows 
Finally, by subtracting  on both sides of the above equation one gets: 
which then leads to 
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Finally, denote by  the debt-to-GDP ratio and by the primary balance-to-
GDP ratio, we can write the above expression as follows 
In this way the growth of the debt-to-GDP ratio ΔBt is decomposed in a contribution stemming 
from the primary balance-to-GDP dt, in the contribution of inflation  in the 
one stemming from real growth  and residual term
  which is small as long as  g and π are between zero and one and that 
therefore can safely be ignored. 
The economic series for the primary deficit St, and the interest payment on debt (Bt–1i), come 
from the database “OECD Economic Outlook No. 104 (Edition 2018/2)”, OECD Economic 
Outlook: Statistics and Projections
https://doi.org/10.1787/5434ee69-en 
The economic series for the government debt is the same used in Figure 1. General government 
consolidated gross debt. Excessive deficit procedure. Based on the European System of 
Accounts ESA 2010. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/indicators-statistics/economic-databases/
macro-economic-database-ameco_en
Furthermore, to be consistent with the definition of public debt (which is based on excessive 
deficit procedures), we took the series for the computation of nominal GDP, real GDP growth 
and inflation from the same AMECO database cited supra
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/indicators-statistics/economic-databases/
macro-economic-database-ameco_en
More precisely, we used as nominal GDP, PtYt, the GDP at current prices, EU member states: 
excessive deficit procedure (UVGDH) taken from the same AMECO database 
Real GDP growth, g, is obtained as the year-to-year variation in the Gross domestic product at 
2010 reference levels (OVGD) 
Finally, the inflation rate π is obtained as the year-to-year variation in the implicit price deflator 
of the nominal GDP series employed (price deflator:UVGDH/ OVGD) 
Figure 3
GDP growth and its contributions. All the original series from FRED have quarterly frequency, 
are seasonally adjusted and are measured at chained 2010 euros. The annual data have been 
computed as the average across four quarters. The contribution  to GDP growth for each 
variable X = {C, I, G, X, M} has been computed as the product between the growth rate of the 
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variable X and the share of X with respect to GDP in the previous period. For example, the 
contribution of consumption at time t is:
.
https://research.stlouisfed.org
Figure 4
Main revenue and expenditure items of the general government sector, notified by national 
authorities in the ESA 2010 transmission programme. Data are presented percentages of GDP. 
(Eurostat code: gov_10a_main).
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/
database?p_p_id=NavTreeportletprod_WAR_NavTreeportletprod_INSTANCE_nPqeVbPXRmWQ
&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-
2&p_p_col_count=1
Figure 5
Comparison of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) dynamics. For each country we have used the 
variable “TFPva_I” from the EU-KLEMS dataset which represents Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
between 1996 and 2016. We have then transformed the variable into an index number for each 
country, dividing by the 1996 value (hence 1996 = 1 for all the countries). The dashed line at 
the unity y-value allows therefore to better grasp evolution from the 1996 reference year.
http://www.euklems.net
Figure 6
Share of firms (top) and average productivity (bottom) in different firm-size categories. The 
figure is a mere reproduction of Figure by Berlingieri et al. (2018).
https://www.lavoce.info/archives/52364/sulla-produttivita-pesa-la-dimensione-impresa
Figure 7
Per capita value added index in the manufacturing sector per macro regions (left) and per 
capita gross fixed capital formation index in the total economy per macro-regions (right). 
Nominal series available from ISTAT have been deflated by the national PPI (not region-specific 
and sourced from FRED) and divided by the population of the macro-area (region-specific).
http://dati.istat.it/?lang=en#
Table 1 
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) excluding interest of general government adjusted for the 
cyclical component. The adjustment are based on trend GDP. Excessive deficit procedure. 
Values presented are computed as the average across the years above mentioned.
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/indicators-statistics/economic-databases/
macro-economic-database-ameco_en
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Table 2
Average real GDP annual growth growth rates. Output-side real GDP at chained PPPs from the 
Penn World Tables. Values presented are computed as the average across the years above 
mentioned.
https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/
Figure Box.1
Shares of outstanding Italian government bonds across 5 different institutional categories: 1) 
Bank of Italy; 2) banks (foreign and domestic); 3) other financial institutions (foreign and 
domestic); 4) foreign households and non-financial corporations; 5) domestic households and 
non-financial corporations. Series “General government debt by holding sector” (TCCE0200)
https://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/basi-dati/bds index.html?com.dotmarketing.htmlpage. 
language=1
Appendix – Additional figures
Figure Appendix. Labour Markets Regional statistics
In %
Source: ISTAT Regional Accounts.
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